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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Until fairly recently a person who suffered harm at the hands
of "government"-whether federal, state, or local-or at the hands
of its agents had no effective, remedy for money damages and was often
thwarted in obtaining equitable relief. Silits in federal courts for dam-
ages against federal officials were held barred since, insofar as the offi-
cials were acting within their authority as government agents, the
claims were foreclosed by the Federal Tort Claims Act,' and, insofar
as the officials were acting beyond their authority, the claims did not
"arise under" federal law.2 Suits for equitable relief against federal of-
ficers were, and still are, frequently held barred by a maze of doctrines
relating to sovereign immunity and the separation of powers.3
1. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). For an excellent dis-
cussion of Bell that foreshadowed future developments in the area, see Katz, The Juris-
prudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood,
117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1 (1968).
3. Compare Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)(suit nominally against a federal officer barred, absent consent, as in effect a suit
against the sovereign government) with United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)
(successful action in ejectment against officers wrongfully in possession of General Robert
E. Lee's Arlington estates) and L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ac-
TION 216-31 (abridged ed. 1965).
It should be noted that the "sovereign immunity" of the federal government is
merely an historical assumption, made on the basis of the eleventh amendment and
the sovereign immunity of the states. See id. at 214; accord, Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 708 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("As to the
States, legal irresponsibility was written into the Constitution by the Eleventh Amend-
ment; as to the United States, it is derived by implication."); Cunningham v. Macon
& B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 ("The
principle [of federal sovereign immunity] has never been discussed or the reasons for
it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.").
In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821), Chief Justice
Marshall stated that "[t]he universally received opinion is, that no suit can be com-
menced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not author-
ize such suits." These words present a bifurcated approach to an answer to the problem
of federal immunity, which lies at the very heart of the problem raised by Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize
suits against the federal government or its officers. See P. BATOR, P. MISHUIN, D. SHA-
PIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE Fa-
ERAL SYSTEM 1326 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. Article
III, section 2 of the Constitution, however, extended the judicial power to "Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party." A literal reading of this section which
considered it self-executing in the same way that the Court in Chisholm considered
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Suits in the federal courts for monetary damages against the states
were uniformly held barred by the eleventh amendment 4 or by the re-
lated doctrine of sovereign immunity; 5 suits in equity against state of-
other sections of article III self-executing, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
432-33 (Iredell, J., dissenting), clearly would lead to the position that the United States
could be compelled to be a party defendant. The Court in Chisholm recognized the
conundrum and resolved it on the dubious ground that the Court would have no power
to enforce its judgments against the United States (implying, of course, that enforce-
ment against the states would present no problem). 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469, 478. Chief
Justice Jay finally left the question open. See the discussion in Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REv. 1,
15 (1967).
In Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), the Court held that the Court
of Claims was not an article III court because it heard claims against the United States
as a defendant and such claims did not fall under article III. This position was revised
in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), in a way that is significant for our discus-
sion of the eleventh amendment. The Court held that article III did extend the judicial
power to suits in which the government was a defendant, but that the power was not
self-executing: article III, section 2 included sub silentio the "well settled and under-
stood" proposition that the sovereign was immune from suit absent its consent.
This same line of argument has been used to explain how, despite the fact that the
judicial power may not be expanded by the consent of the parties, see Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), or by the Congress, see Hodgson v. Bower-
bank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 303 (1809), the federal courts may hear suits against con-
senting states, see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883), and suits in which Con-
gress has bestowed jurisdiction on the federal courts, see Parden v. Terminal Ry. of
Ala., 377 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964) (semble). Supreme Court jurisdiction to review on
writ of error cases in which a state was a party below rests ultimately on the ground
that the states surrendered their rights in the original plan of the Constitution. See gen-
erally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
4. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST,
amend. XI.
5. The distinction between suits barred by the eleventh amendment and those
barred by sovereign immunity is a difficult one to draw because sovereign immunity
has been held to be "the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exempli-
fication." Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (prohibition of suits
against states in admiralty). The courts have recognized that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is in "disfavor." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 723 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege, or
is a manifestation merely of power, . . . it undoubtedly runs counter to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts
reflect a strong legislative momentum in their tendency to extend the legal re-
sponsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly
fifty years ago, that "it is a wholesome sight to see 'the Crown' sued and an-
swering for its torts."
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 582 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
Despite this, the Supreme Court has closed the federal courts in a variety of situa-
tions not expressly covered by the eleventh amendment. Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. at 322-23 (suits by foreign countries against states barred by the
"postulates" underlying the amendment); Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627 (1914)
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ficers frequently met with the same fate .6 Lesser local government en-
tities-counties, cities, towns, and various local boards and agencies-
had early been excluded from the protection of the eleventh amend-
ment and sovereign immunity,7 but suit against them in the federal
courts was for years effectively precluded by Monroe v. Pape,8 which
held that municipalities were not "persons" for purposes of jurisdic-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.9
A major breakthrough in this area occurred when the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1 ° the immediate effect of
(sovereign immunity extended to Puerto Rico, though a waiver by appearance was
found); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (barring suit by congressionally created
corporation); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1890) (citizens of a state barred
from suing their own states in federal courts); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76 (1883) (barring parens patriae suits by states on behalf of their citizens).
It should be noted, however, that in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
412 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall made explicit -his thesis that the language of article
III of the Constitution still prevailed except where the eleventh amendment explicitly
provided otherwise. This view has, in recent times, been espoused by Mr. Justice
Brennan. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Healths & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 317-22 (1973) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Stevens also has recently questioned the constitutional basis for the holdings in Hans and
Principality of Monaco. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458-60 (1976) (con-
curring opinion). Such arguments essentially go, of course, to the purposes and effect
of the eleventh amendment.
6. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (refusal to enjoin tax collection
suits brought by Virginia officials against defendants who had proffered Virginia's own
interest coupons in payment of taxes and who claimed under the contract clause); cf.
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952) (injunction allowed;
suit characterized as one to restrain unconstitutional acts by officers, rather than as a
suit to enforce a contract with the state).
7. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); cf. Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (judicial mandate to levy taxes to support schools);
Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (Court ignored the eleventh amendment
issue that illegally collected taxes had been intermingled with state funds).
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (damages against the City of Chicago). Accord, City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (equitable relief); Moor v. County of Ala-
meda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (damages against County); cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976) (federal court may not join county as party under its pendent jurisdic-
tion). The rule has been extended by the lower federal courts to include lesser local
government bodies. E.g., Kornit v. Board of Educ., 542 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) ; Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977). See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities
for Constitutional Violations, 89 HA.av. L. REv. 922, 924 n.15 (1976).
9.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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which was to provide a federal cause of action arising directly from the
Constitution for violations of fourth amendment rights by federal of-
ficials.' Indirectly, Bivens has also provided the means by which lower
federal courts have closed the loophole in federal protection opened by
the Supreme Court's exclusion of local government bodies from juris-
diction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 Moreover, the case may have exten-
sive effects in the eleventh amendment area as well.13
11. The Court in Bivens answered the question left open in Bell v. Hood, 327
UJ.S. 678 (1946), by holding that a cause of action arising under the Constitution
would lie against federal officers who violated fourth amendment rights while acting
under color of their federal authority. The decision is of enormous importance because
it treats the Constitution as law, a primary source of judicial authority to provide a
remedy: "[lit is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a fed-
eral statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 403 U.S. at 396 quoting Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684). To this extent it overrules the odd doctrine of Wheeldin
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), that, in suits for damages against federal officials,
state tort law governed the cause of actions and remedies while federal law merely
supplied the defense. The case is also important for any discussion of the eleventh
amendment because of its holding that "[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as
the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 403 U.S. at 395.
Lower federal courts have extended the reasoning of Bivens to causes of action aris-
ing under other amendments of the Constitution. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note
3, at 226-27 (1977 Supp.).
On remand in Bivens, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), the court held that although
the officers could not claim immunity, they had available the qualified privilege of
"good faith and reasonableness."
12. For a list of the cases, see Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court has yet to pass explicitly on the question, but has approved the
practice by implication. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) (semble); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1973).
Under the doctrine of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) to decide whether a claim of violation of fourth
amendment rights gives rise to a cause of action for damages. 327 U.S. at 681-83.
Bivens provides jurisdiction over the remedy. Alternatively, the lower federal courts have
entertained causes under 42 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), which has the advantage of not
requiring a specific amount in controversy. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 929-32.
The Second Circuit is seriously divided over this question. In Brault v. Town of
Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), a panel of the court held that a cause of action
for damages lay against a municipality for depriving a property owner of the use of his
property. The municipality had secured an injunction against the property owner under
an invalidly adopted zoning ordinance. Judges Smith and Oakes held that jurisdiction
existed under the fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Judge Timbers
in dissent argued that the congressional intent to exclude municipalities from jurisdic-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) also should exclude such hybrid suits. The Second
Circuit reversed en bane on the grounds that, absent a claim of malice, no cause of
action was stated. The question arose in Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d
Cir. 1975), a suit for damages against the city for its officers' illegal entry into and
search of an apartment. The court remanded the case for consideration whether, assum-
ing a cause of action would lie under the fourteenth amendment, the action was barred
by the appropriate statute of limitations. Id. at 76. The most recent Second Circuit case
on the matter is Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977), which allowed a suit
against members of a school board in their official capacities directly under the Con-
stitution.
13. See text accompanying notes 189-234 infra.
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Only the states themselves, protected by their sovereign immunity
and the eleventh amendment, have remained unaffected by this expan-
sion of constitutional protection. Because of the doctrines of Ex parte
Young 14 and Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,15 how-
ever, the sphere of states' immunity is restricted almost solely16 to the
"core area"' 7 of damage suits seeking compensation for past actions of
the state.' 8 Professor Jaffe notes the following as generally falling
within the "core area": "the enforcement of contracts, treasury liabil-
ity for tort, and the adjudication of interests in property which has
come unsullied by tort into the bosom of the government."'19
This "core area" of immunity is an ill-defined region whose con-
tours have been shaped by history, not logic, and largely reflect the
English common law background of sovereign immunity.20 It is not
true, as some have maintained, that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is an ancient concept, and is apparently founded on the con-
cept that the king, a terrestrial representative of Deity, could do no
wrong. ' 21 Although there were some rhetorical flourishes to that effect,
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
15. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The further judicial limitations placed on the immunity
of the states (that suits may be brought against a state by the United States or by other
states and that federal judicial review of state decisions in which a state was a party
may be had) and the growing consensus concerning congressional power to define the
limits of both sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment are discussed in text
accompanying notes 124-73 infra.
16. The exceptions arise when what are on their face actions for specific relief
brought against state or federal officers go beyond "merely ordering the cessation of the
conduct complained of [and require] affirmative action by the sovereign or the dis-
position of unquestionably sovereign property." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11. (1949).
The question becomes difficult and the area of controversy is entered when the
suit is not one for damages [against the officer] but for specific relief: i.e., the
recovery of specific property or monies, ejectment from land, or injunction
either directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions. In each such
case the question is directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief against
the officer, relief will not, in effect, be obtained against the sovereign. For the
sovereign can act only through agents and, when an agent's actions are re-
strained, the sovereign itself may, through him, be restrained. . . . It arises
whenever suit is brought against an officer of the sovereign in which the re-
lief sought from him is not compensation for an alleged wrong but, rather,
the prevention or discontinuance, in rem, of the wrong.
Id. at 687-88. For an excellent study of the area and pointed criticism of the Larson
case, see L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 215-31.
17. L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 221.
18. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
19. See L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 199-200.
20. Id. at 221.
21. Comment, Misapplication of Governmental Immunity-Epting v. Utah, 1976
UTAH L. REv. 186 (citations omitted).
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especially in later attempts to harmonize the common law, 22 from at
least about the time of Bracton it was established that the king was
under the law.23 The fact that the king could not be sued in his own
name in the English courts24 appears rather -to be a result of the his-
torical accident that it was considered anomalous for the king to be
sued under his own writ.2 5
Although the form of suits directly against the Crown was absent,
English law from the thirteenth century on clearly shows that relief
was available to the injured citizen, either in the form of suits against
officers of the Crown, or as suits with the consent of the king (petition
of right, monstrans de droit, etc.) .26 Professor Jaffe has advanced the
ingenious argument that the phrase "the King can do no wrong" meant
in legal theory that the king was not allowed to do or tolerate wrong
and was, consequently, "bound" to grant such petitions for consent and
could not capriciously refuse them.27 Whether or not this is true,28 the
fact remains that the form of direct suits against the sovereign without
his consent was absent in the common law.
The transfer of -the English system to the colonies and the Ameri-
can Revolution effectively destroyed half of the remedies available in
England.
By a magnificent irony, this body of doctrine and practice, at least
in form so favorable to the subject, lost one-half of its efficacy when
translated into our state and federal systems. Because the King had
been abolished, the courts concluded that where in the past the pro-
cedure had been by petition of right there was now no one author-
ized to consent to suit!2
22. See, e.g., Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 682, 683-84 n.6 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Comment, Title, the Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An His-
torical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 38 (1976).
24. L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 198.
25. 9 HoLnswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENOLISH LAv 8 (3d ed. 1944), quoted in
L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 199.
Mr. Justice Holmes expressed what is arguably the Realpolitik of the situation,
though it is in fact historically and constitutionally inaccurate: "A sovereign is exempt
from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
26. See L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 199-203.
27. Id. at 199, 203 n.19.
28. See the discussion in Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Inter-
pretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207, 207-09 (1968). It may be hypothesized that the very
success of the English system prevented the rise of suits directly against the king.
29. L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 197. It should be noted, however, that as early as
1778 Virginia established procedures similar to those in the English system for allowing
[Vol. 27
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However one interprets this English law background, it is not at
all clear that the new American republic intended to have any sover-
eign but the people,20 and, if it did so intend, that the states were to
be that sovereign or share in sovereignty. 31 This, in essence, is the de-
bate that raged around the adoption of article III and the eleventh
amendment.
This Comment essays to present an historically valid and logically
and legally coherent refutation of the traditional learning which has
held that the sovereign immunity of the states was "constitutionalized"
by the eleventh amendment or was already implicit in the original in-
tention of the Framers of the Constitution. To some extent the essay
is based on a desire to correct the obvious moral and jurisprudential
error of a series of cases-Louisiana v. Jumel,32 Hans v. Louisiana,
Palmer v. Ohio, 4 etc.-which have subordinated nationalized funda-
mental constitutional rights, as well as Congress' article I powers, the
supremacy clause and the judiciary article to an invalid conception of
federalism read into the eleventh amendment. To some extent the es-
say is motivated by the need to supply the logical underpinnings for
the recent case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 35 which held that Congress, act-
ing under the powers conferred by section five of the fourteenth
amendment, could abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states and
suits against itself in its courts. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 563 (1962). All
of the states have to a greater or lesser extent consented by statute to be sued for their
tortious actions. W. PRossER, THF. LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 975 (4th ed. 1971). In
addition, since 1961 the highest courts of at least five states have judicially abrogated
their states' immunity. See W. PROSSER, supra, at 985-86; Cullison, supra note 2, at 34.
The effect of this judicial action on suits in tort traditionally barred from the federal
courts by the eleventh amendment has yet to be decided, but the Supreme Court has
frequently held that states may statutorily abrogate their immunity only to the extent
of subjecting themselves to suits in their own courts. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 470 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 55
(1944); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 (1904); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441
(1900). All of these cases essentially turned on whether an ambiguously worded statute
could be construed as "consent" to be sued in a fedetal court; in all of them no con-
sent was found. The further question of which official in the state government may waive
immunity is more complex. Compare Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (volun-
tary appearance of attorney general of state in court to claim a fund construed as a
waiver) with Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Guernsey, 205 F. 91 (D.C. Cir. 1913) (the
legislature of the state alone may consent).
30. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 455 (1793) (remarks
of Mr. Justice Wilson).
31. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 23, at 52.
32. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
33. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
35. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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provide a federal forum and federal remedies against the states for vio-
lations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Fitzpatrick, definitely a break
with the past in many respects, is a datum in need of explanation,
rather than itself an explanation. For example, to the extent that sov-
ereign immunity had been "constitutionalized" by the eleventh amend-
ment, article III must have been impaired; this in turn would have
prevented Congress from conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts.
One explanation of Fitzpatrick is -that the fourteenth amendment re-
stored or enhanced the judicial power impaired by the eleventh amend-
ment.36 This, however, requires two rather metaphysical changes in the
judicial power and at the same time leaves unexplained how the "im-
paired" judicial power has always been able to entertain private suits
against consenting states. Mere consent of the parties should not be
able to expand the jurisdiction conferred by article IIIY.3 Finally, this
Comment attempts to incorporate the principles of Bivens s and Testa
v. Kat 9 into the traditional learning on the eleventh amendment.
I. THE TRADITIONAL LEARNING: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Succinctly put, the traditional notion is that "[t]he purpose of the
Amendment was -to overrule Chisholm and to reassert the principles
of state sovereignty rejected in that decision. The immediacy of the
furor aroused by the decision strongly indicates that the decision con-
travened the popular understanding of the relation of the states to the
federal government." 40 Under this interpretation, the consternation
aroused by Chisholm v. Georgia4' was caused by conflicting views on
federalism, not on the separation of powers, and thus the rejection of
Chisholm necessarily meant the reinstatement of the original under-
standing of the constitutional system: that article III did not extend
the judicial power of the United States to suits in which states were
compelled to be defendants.
36. This argument was rejected by the Second Circuit's opinion in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975).
37. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
38. 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see note 11 supra.
39. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that the supremacy clause allows Congress to
require state courts to provide a forum for the adjudication and enforcement of federally
created rights).
40. Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 10, 346 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1976).
41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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To account for the undoubted instances in which a state was made
a party defendant by another state or in which a state consented to
being sued in the federal courts by an individual, the traditional
theory relies on a second implicit proviso of the original plan which,
had it been written, would have read: If a state shall be made a party
defendant by another state, or shall have consented to being sued in
a federal court by an individual, the Judicial Power shall extend to
such controversies.
From this reading of article III, as re-established by the eleventh
amendment, necessarily comes -the fetish quality attached to the ex-
plicit, actual consent 42 or (by very strained construction) implied con-
sent43 of the state when an individual seeks to make it a party defend-
ant in the federal courts. The traditional view also necessarily leads
to a denial of Congress' powers to create causes of action upon which
an individual may sue a state, or officers of the state in a suit in effect
against the state, in a federal court. In speaking of Congress' power
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, for example, the Second Circuit
as recently as 1972 stated: "[O]f course Congress cannot by statute nul-
lify the protection which the Constitution in the form of the Eleventh
Amendment affords to the states. '44 This is, of course, beside the point
since the issue is precisely what degree of protection is afforded by the
amendment.
The traditional view did more than merely excise from article
III the class of controversies arising "between a State and Citizens of
another State" in which states were defendants. In effect it necessarily
constitutionalized sovereign immunity,45 either on the view that sov-
ereign immunity was "incorporated" in article III by the Framers, or
that it was imposed on article III by the eleventh amendment. This
point is essential to any understanding of the eleventh amendment,
42. See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944) (clear and un-
equivocal consent). See generally Hyneman, Judicial Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, 2 IND. L.J. 371, 385-88 (1927).
43. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See generally
.Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 331
(1966).
44. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1972).
45. "[I]t seems unquestionable that the States retain concurrent authority with
Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the eleventh amendment of the Con-
stitution, but upon the soundest principles of general reasoning." Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1820) (remarks of Mr. Justice Story). This "exemplification"
theory of the eleventh amendment, see Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497
(1921), is usually assumed rather than debated. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 43, at
333 n.10.
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both because it supplies the basis for "extending" the eleventh amend-
ment beyond its language, and because on this ground the Supreme
Court has limited other grants of jurisdiction in article III-federal
question jurisdiction, for example. 46 All of the elements of this tradi-
tional view are present in the series of cases that arose in the 1870's
from the State of Louisiana's repudiation by constitutional amendment
of its obligations under its bonds.
A. The Louisiana Bond Cases
In Louisiana v. Jumel47 holders of bond coupons instituted an
ex relatione action in state court to compel the state's treasurer to re-
deem their coupons by applying funds appropriated for that purpose
under the former constitution of the state. At the same time, the rela-
tors sought an injunction in the federal circuit court to prevent the
state's officers and courts from giving effect to the sections of the new
constitution that impaired the obligation of their contracts with the
state. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the federal suit on
eleventh amendment grounds: the suit was by citizens of other states
and was in effect one against the "supreme political power of the
state."48 This result was felt to be compelled by the eleventh amend-
ment, despite an admitted violation of the contract clause of the Con-
stitution, and despite the fact that the only authority for the majority's
position was an old English case. 49
46. See text accompanying notes'57-62 infra.
47. 107 U.S. 711 (1882). See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531
(1875) (allowing an injunction to prevent the state's officers from diverting the money
collected to other ends).
48. 107 U.S. at 720, 727-28. The majority's view is expressed in the rhetoric of
"political questions": "It needs no argument to show that the political power cannot
be thus ousted of its jurisdiction and the judiciary set in its place." Id. at 727-28. See
also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). If we ignore eleventh amendment prob-
lems for the moment, these arguments are still beside the point: they may make a valid
tenth amendment point or an argument from the difficulty of establishing standards for
the area, but the "mixed problem" of a "political question" (whose resolution may be
confined by the Constitution to another branch of government) that involves viola-
tions of individual rights should never on that ground alone be a bar to judicial review.
See Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (judicial power to construe article I,
§ 5 of the Constitution, which grants to Congress the power to review the qualifica-
tions of its members); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (fourteenth amendment
imposes a "negative content" on article IV, § 4 of the Constitution that allows ju-
dicial relief when action that is admittedly political violates that negative standard and
causes individual injury). But see Giligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (plurality
opinion declining jurisdiction over Ohio National Guard in complaint arising out of
Kent State killings, because case involved a "nonjusticiable political question").
49. Regina v. Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 7 Q.B. 387 (1872), cited in
107 U.S. at 7.
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Mr. Justice Field dissented on the grounds that the suit was not
in effect against the state and that even if it was,
[w]hen a State enters into the markets of the world as a borrower,
she, for the time, lays aside her sovereignty and becomes responsible
as a civil corporation, And although suits against her even then may
not be allowed, her officers can be compelled to do what she then
contracts that they shall do.50
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a very creative and constructive dissent.
Basing his arguments on -the general federal question jurisdiction re-
cently conferred on the lower federal courts,5 1 he argued two points.
First, because of the supremacy clause, the Louisiana officers (and
courts) were under the "duty imposed by the fundamental law of the
land, not to regard as binding any State enactment which impairs the
obligation of contracts."5 2 In essence, this argument goes to the prin-
ciple of Testa v. Katt5 s and implies that the relators would have been
better off in a state court in which they could have compelled enforce-
ment of their federal right. Justice Harlan's second argument went to
the nature of federalism:
It would seem, then, that holders of the consolidated bonds of
Louisiana are in this anomalous condition: While her courts, because
of the Debt Ordinance in the new Constitution, will not, by manda-
mus, compel her officers to perform the purely ministerial duties im-
posed by the statute and Constitution of 1874 [the former constitu-
tion], but will, by using that writ, require those officers to execute the
provisions of that ordinance, although it is confessedly in conflict
with the Federal Constitution, the courts of the United States, though
now invested with jurisdiction of all suits arising under the Consti-
tution and the laws of the United States, are, according to the pres-
ent decision, without power to compel those officers to respect the
inhibition in the supreme law of the land against State laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts. Such are the results which follow from
50. 107 U.S. at 740. Essentially the same doctrine had been followed by Chief
Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 904, 906-07 (1824).
51. By the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
52. 107 U.S. at 755.
53. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See note 39 supra. In concurring in Employees of Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), Mr. Justice Marshall argued that while the Congress could not lift the states'
immunity from suit in the federal courts, it could lift that immunity to the extent of
requiring the state courts to hear FLSA claims against their own states. Implicit in Mr.
Justice Marshall's argument is the premise that an act of Congress is necessary to lift
that immunity. This is not required by the eleventh amendment and goes beyond the
interpolation of the amendment into articles I and III and positions it above even the
supremacy clause.
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the action of the "supreme political power" of a State whose officers,
sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, are required
by the State court, and now permitted by this court, to regard the
State Constitution as their "exclusive mandate and absolutely bind-
ing on them."5 4
In the same term, the Court decided New Hampshire v. Loui-
siana,55 in which it rejected New Hampshire's attempt to sue as parens
patriae to obtain relief for its citizens who had been defrauded by
Louisiana. Given the presuppositions on the eleventh amendment held
by the Court, the case is sound, but, in deciding the question, the
Court made a rare argument: -to preserve the sovereignty of Louisiana,
the Court limited the sovereign power of New Hampshire to sue on
behalf of its citizens. "All the rights of the States as independent na-
tions were surrendered to the United States."56 This is certainly a per-
verse use of what is obviously a two-edged sword.
In 1890 the Court decided the last of these cases, Hans v. Loui-
siana,57 which is the main bone of contention in arguments over the
eleventh amendment 58 because it makes clear -the presuppositions of
the traditional view of the amendment and article III: since Hans, as
a citizen of Louisiana, was not literally within the prohibitions of the
eleventh amendment, the dismissal of his claim required an exegesis
of the eleventh amendment and its postulates. Debates over Hans are
usually confined to this point, but arguably the real importance of the
54. 107 U.s. at 767-68.
In essence this argument reproduces that of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-07 (1821), that the eleventh amendment does
not protect the states in cases involving the Constitution and federal laws. Id. at 407.
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, would have extended this argument to give the Court
jurisdiction over a creditor's claim against a state. According to Chief Justice Marshall,
it was the states' fear of precisely this type of suit that motivated the eleventh amend-
ment. Id. Mr. Justice Harlan avoided the obvious difficulty with this approach
by construing the suit as one in equity and, adopting another position of Chief Justice
Marshall's, by denying outright that the eleventh amendment was applicable unless a
state was a named party. Justice Marshall had left open the question of the state as
real party in United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 115, 139 (1809); adopted
the view that the eleventh amendment barred only suits against states as named parties
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 851 (1824); and
finally rejected that view in Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110
(1828). The question was put to rest in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
55. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
56. Id. at 90.
57. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
58. Compare, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) and Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) with Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 317-22 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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case is that it clearly presented and rejected the arguments for an al-
ternative ground of federal jurisdiction first made by Chief Justice
John Marshall in Cohens and touched upon by Justice Harlan in
Jumel.
Hans brought suit in the federal circuit court directly against
Louisiana to recover about $87,000 interest due on the state's bonds.
He based his claim on the bonds, and his right to recover despite the
change in Louisiana's constitution, on the contract clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution. Suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 59 The
question presented in the Supreme Court was "whether a State can be
sued in a Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens
upon a suggestion that the case is one that arises under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States" 6°0-that is, whether, regardless of the
nature of the parties, the contract clause and the predecessor of 28
U.S.C. § 1381 gave the federal courts an independent basis of juris-
diction.6'
Despite this clear presentation of the question, it was answered
only indirectly and on uncertain grounds by the Court's holding that
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain suits brought by a citi-
zen of a state against -that state. Two interrelated arguments were made
to support the result. First, the Court reasoned that the background of
the eleventh amendment made it clear that, despite its wording, its
purpose was to defeat jurisdiction in such cases, and that such a pur-
pose had also been the original intent of the Constitution:
The letter is appealed to now, as it was [in Chisholm], as a ground
for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. The
reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an
attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of. Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citi-
zens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst
the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the
Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing
therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the
59. 24 F. 55 (E.D. La. 1885).
60. 134 U.S. at 9.
61. Id. The Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (repealed),
gave the circuit courts federal question jurisdiction: "[T]he circuit courts of the United
States shall have original cognizance . . . of all suits of a civil nature ... arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States .... "
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States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its
face.
6 2
It should be noted that neither the parties nor the Court distin-
guished general jurisdiction over a class of cases from jurisdiction in
a particular case to give a remedy. To anticipate a later discussion,
neither the Court nor the parties addressed Justice Iredell's objection
in his dissent in Chisholm that the Court in that case lacked statutory
authority to give a remedy.63 According to Justice Iredell, even if the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and article III of the Constitution gave -the Su-
preme Court jurisdiction over the class of cases of which Chisholm was
a member, 4 no power had been given the Court to fashion a novel
remedy, one for which no precedent existed at common law-that is,
one against a state. Consequently, there were two separable aspects to
the question raised in Hans. The first is Justice Iredell's point: was
federal question jurisdiction a grant of authority to give such a rem-
edy? The traditional answer appears to be that it is not. (Quaere, how-
ever, whether Justice Harlan's insistence in Jumel that the contract
clause supplied the deficiency might not be correct: the analogy to
Bivens65 and Bell v. Hood6 6 is compelling.)
The second aspect of the federal question issue in Hans had first
been raised 'by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.T
There, the Chief Justice held that the Supreme Court's issuance of
a writ of error to a state's highest court was not precluded by the
eleventh amendment and that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
under article III and section 25 of the Judiciary Act to review the
federal questions raised. 'One of the arguments with which he but-
tressed his position was that the purpose of the eleventh amendment
was to allay states' fears of creditors, and its effect was solely that. Fed-
eral issues were not precluded. "[A] case arising under the constitution
or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union,
whoever may be the parties to that case."' s The precise point rejected
in Hans (though the Court did not in these terms discuss it) was an
extension to the lower courts of this power to decide federal issues re-
gardless of the nature of the parties.69 The question of jurisdiction over
62. 134 U.S. at 15.
63. See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
64. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLvR, supra note 3, at 35.
65. See note 11 supra.
66. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
67. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
68. Id. at 383. See also id. at 407.
69. 134 U.S. at 19-20.
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the remedy was not raised but it is the crucial one: if, for the moment,
federal jurisdiction over the remedy is assumed-either by congres-
sional grant, as in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,70 or derived directly from the
Constitution, as in Bivens7 '-then the power of lower federal courts
to decide federal issues in the first instance, regardless of the nature of
the parties, should have been upheld.
The Court's second argument in Hans was an appeal to the na-
ture of sovereignty. It quoted for the purpose the words of Alexander
Hamilton in Number 81 of The Federalist:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one
of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of
every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
States, and the danger intimated [under some interpretations of arti-
cle III] must be merely ideal.... [T]here is no color to pretend that
the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be di-
vested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way,
free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations
of good faith."2
On the basis of this second line of reasoning it is frequently contended
that Hans is not constitutionally required; that it merely represents
judicial deference to the common law of immunity. 3 The Supreme
Court has just as frequently considered it a constitutional decision. 4
The latter view is somewhat more compelling. It must not be for-
gotten that Hamilton's disquisition was addressed to the Constitutional
Conventions and was meant to allay the fears of the states about the
purpose of article III. The Court in Hans itself uses the quotation
both to indicate the original plan of the Constitution and to describe
the effect of the eleventh amendment.75 In addition, it is difficult to
understand how mere deference to common law immunity without
more could justify the dismissal of a clear federal claim.
The argument of the Court in Hans is, however, an historical
one: the eleventh amendment is either an exemplification of the
70. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
71. See text accompanying notes 217-18 infra.
72. 134 U.S. at 13.
73. See, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 317-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., id. at 283.
75. See 134 U.S. at 13-14.
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0original" understanding of the Constitutional plan (which is more
likely the case) or it incorporated that understanding into the Con-
stitution. The error of the Court in Hans lies not in this, but in its
determination of the nature of that understanding: the Court un-
doubtedly believed it to be sovereign immunity.7
In reaching this decision on the historical question, the Court
reasoned that the eleventh amendment had "overruled" Chisholm v.
Georgia:
This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of
the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually
reversed the decision of the Supreme Court.... The Supreme Court
had construed the judicial power as extending to [suits against a state
by citizens of other states] and its decision was thus overruled.
This view of the force and meaning of the amendment is im-
portant. It shows that, on this question of the suability of the States
by individuals, the highest authority of this country was in accord
rather with the minority than with the majority of the court in the
decision of the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and this fact lends addi-
tional interest to the able opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell on that oc-
casion.77
After such a noble beginning, however, the Court in Hans proceeded
to attribute to Justice Iredell views that he may have held but cer-
tainly never expressed. The Court found the majority's error in
Chisholm to have been its construction of the judicial power to extend
to suits by an individual against a state; it ignored the subtlety that this
error could be viewed in two ways: one, as an extension of the judi-
cial power beyond article III, and the other, as an extension of that
power beyond the authority given by -the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
Court read Justice Iredell's opinion as espousing the first view when,
in fact, he narrowly limited his dissent to the second point.
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had authorized -the fed-
eral courts to issue writs "which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages
of law."78 Justice Iredell limited his holding in Chisholm precisely to
the Act and precisely to the case before him: a common law action for
assumpsit. He deliberately refrained from what he considered the un-
76. It should be noted that in this sense Justice Frankfurters often quoted re-
mark that "as to the States, legal irresponsibility was written into the Constitution by the
Eleventh Amendment" is misleading: according to Hans, that irresponsibility was in-
tended from the beginning.
77. 134 U.S. at 11-12.
78. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
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necessary consideration of knotty constitutional issues. 79 He reasoned
that even if Congress had the power to abrogate the sovereign immu-
nity of the states in simple assumpsit actions (a supposition about
which he had strong reservations), it had in the Judiciary Act empow-
ered the Court to give only remedies in accord with the "principles of
the old [i.e., common] law" which was ignorant of remedies directly
against the sovereign.s0 In other words, the All Writs Act functioned
as a restriction on the power of the Court. It should be noted here that
Justice Iredell's strong doubts that Congress could have in any case
created a new remedy embracing the states appear to have been lim-
ited to Congress' power to create a remedy for the recovery of money
where no federal interest was present.8 '
B. The Original Understanding: Federalism or Separation of Powers?
Charles Warren, in his history of the Supreme Court,8 2 advocated
the interpretation of the eleventh amendment advanced in Hans and,
by his researches, has given it a seeming historical validity that in turn
79. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449.
80. Id. For discussions of Justice Iredells opinion reaching substantially the same
conclusion as that in the text, see Cullison, supra note 2, at 10-11; Nowak, The Scope
of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the
History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1432-33
(1975).
81.
[I]t may not be improper to intimate that my present opinion is strongly
against any construction of [the Constitution], which will admit, under any
circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money. I
think every word in the Constitution may have its full effect without involving
this consequence, and that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable
implication (neither of which I consider, can be found in this case) would
authorize the deduction of so high a power.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 449-50. Where, however, more of a federal
interest is involved, Justice Iredell was not so diffident. He reasoned that the Judiciary
Act's phrase, "principles and usages of law," could mean either the "particular laws of
the State against which the suit is brought," or "[p]rinciples of law common to all the
States." Id. at 434. If the former, he reasoned, the result might be that an action would
lie in the Supreme Court against some states but not against others, or that the method
of proceeding against a state would be different for each state. He viewed these possible
outcomes as unacceptable. "If any such difference existed in the laws of the different
States, there would seem to be a propriety, in order to induce uniformity, (if a Con-
stitutional power for that purpose exists), that Congress should prescribe a rule . . . "
Id. This interpretation is consistent with his later opinions. See Nowak, supra note 80,
at 1433 n.116. On the background of his famous dissent, see Fordham, Iredell's Dissent
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 8 N.C. HIST. REv. 155 (1931).
82. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91-102
(1926).
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has exerted considerable influence on later decisions of the Supreme
Court.88 His thesis is a simple one:
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant
and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of
deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been
disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Fed-
eral Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissi-
pation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power that the
Constitution was finally adopted.84
Warren viewed this apprehension of the states largely as a fear of be-
ing compelled to answer for their war debts and their seizure of Tory
property,85 and also as representing an almost unanimous affirmance
of the inherency of the state's sovereign immunity in the constitutional
plan.
Charles Warren,8 6 the Supreme Court,87 and almost every other
court ever to consider the question of sovereign immunity8 have
blithely argued that the remarks of Hamilton in Number 81 of The
Federalist,89 and the speeches of Marshall ° and Madison0 ' before the
Virginia Constitutional Convention, clearly show an almost unanimous
consensus on the part of the Framers that sovereign immunity should
be "constitutionalized." Hence, they argue, the consternation of the
nation at the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm, and hence the
83. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974).
84. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 91.
85.
While this opposition to the Court's decision was to some extent based on diver-
gencies of political theories as to State sovereignty, the real source of the attack
on the Chisholm Case was the very concrete fear of the "numerous prosecu-
tions that will immediately issue from the various claims of refugees, Tories,
etc .......
Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
86. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 91.
87. See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 330 (1934); Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
88. See, e.g., Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 346 N.E.2d 305 (1976).
89. "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton), at 487 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961).
90. "It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged
before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing
in other states." 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (1901).
91. "It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only
operation [article III, section 2] can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring suit
against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court." Id. at 533.
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adoption of the eleventh amendment in order to restore the status quo
ante.
In Warren's view this unanimity of the Framers was apparent in
the reaction of the -nation to Chisholm:
The decision fell upon the country with a profound shock. Both
the Bar and the public in general appeared entirely unprepared for
the doctrine upheld by the Court; and their surprise was warranted,
when they recalled the fact that the vesting of any such jurisdiction
over sovereign States had been expressly disclaimed and even resented
by the great defenders of the Constitution, during the days of the
contest over its adoption.92
Succintly put, Warren's position is that the error of the Court in
Chisholm consisted in its extension of the judiciary power of the
United States beyond the limits of article III and the Constitution as
a whole; the sovereignty of the states was implicit in the Constitution
when adopted and was reiterated, in the face of judicial misconstruc-
tion, by the eleventh amendment.
More recent historians,9 3 especially Clyde Jacobs,94 have to a very
large extent undermined Warren's position. Warren makes several no-
table errors of fact,95 but his principal failing as an historian was in the
92. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 96. The sentiments have become almost a
truism. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949);
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 86-88 (1883).
93. E.g., J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (Volume 1 of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States)
ch. 16 (1971); Mathis, supra note 28; Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and
Settlement, 54 J. AM. HIST. 19 (1967).
94. C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972);
Jacobs, Prelude to Amendment: The States before the Court, 12 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
19" (1968).
95. Warren's relation of the facts which gave rise to Chisholm, for example, is as
follows:
Dallas in his Reports does not state the circumstances under which the
Chisholm Case arose. They were as follows (see Philadelphia dispatch in Salem
Gazette, March 6, 1793): 'A citizen of Georgia had left America prior to the
Revolution and removed to Great Britain, after settling a partnership account
with two partners in trade whose bonds he took for the balance due. After his
decease, his executors (who were citizens of South Carolina) on making appli-
cation for payment found that these two persons who had given their joint
bonds had been inimical to the cause of liberty in the United States and that
their property was confiscated. The executors, alleging that the bond was given
previous to the Revolution, applied to the State of Georgia for relief.'
1 C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 93 n.1.
It should be noted that even under this statement of the facts of Chisholm no fed-
eral question other than the question of jurisdiction was presented. The "constitutional
right" presented by Attorney General Randolph as the question for the court was pre-
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extension of his conclusions beyond his factual base. Even if one were
to-accept the assumption that the excerpts from Hamilton, Madison
and Marshall stand for the proposition for which they are quoted, 0
the fact remains that equally numerous and influential voices were
raised for the opposite view.
The clause in article III, section 2 of the Constitution providing
that the judicial power shall extend to controversies "between a State
and Citizens of another State" appeared for the first time in the drafts
of the Committee of Detail appointed by the Constitutional Conven-
tion on July 25, 1787.7 The five members of the Committee were John
Rutledge, the Chairman, James Wilson, Nathaniel Ghorum, Oliver
Ellsworth, and Edmund Randolph. The clause in question appears to
have been added by Rutledge (it is in his handwriting) to the draft
of the judiciary article prepared by Randolph.98
No explanation for the clause survives in the records of the Con-
vention or in the correspondence of the delegates; it apparently ex-
cisely the question of jurisdiction under article III. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dali.) 419, 420-22 (1793).
Warren's relation of the facts in the case actually comes from the March 5, 1793
edition of the Salem Gazette, which based itself on the accounts of Alexander Dallas in
the Philadelphia Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser for February 19, 1793. In the
editions of the paper for February 20 and 21, however, Dallas and Samuel Bayard, the
clerk of the Court, repudiated the story. See Mathis, supra note 28, at 217 n.38.
The actual facts of the case are these: In 1777 two agents of the Executive Council
of Georgia purchased $167,000 worth of supplies for the Revolutionary Army stationed
near Savannah from Robert Farquhar of Charleston, South Carolina. Farquhar's pcti-
tions for payment were repeatedly refused by Georgia on the grounds that payment had
already been made to the agents. After Farquhar's untimely death in 1794 (he was
struck in the head and knocked overboard by the boom of a pilot boat in Savannah
Harbor), his executor, Alexander Chisholm, brought suit in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Georgia, only to be dismissed by a panel presided over by
Justice Iredell. Farquhar's Executor v. Georgia (unreported, Oct. 1791). In August 1792,
Chisholm brought a suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. After a
default judgment had been entered against Georgia on February 13, 1794, but before
a writ of enquiry for damages was sued out, the state settled with Farquhar's daughter
(who in the meantime had married Chisholm) for slightly more than £7500 in the
form of eight state certificates. Two of these were redeemed before the Georgia Legisla-
ture in 1799 mandated periodic renewal of the certificates, a mandate with which
daughter failed to comply. In 1847, seventy years after the debt was contracted, the
legislature granted the son-in-law, then a resident of Great Britain, the sum of $22,222.22
to be paid within ten years. See generally J. GOEBEL 726; Mathis, supra note 28, at
217-24; Nowak, supra note 80, at 1430-31.
96. Both Marshall and Hamilton also made inconsistent statements. See text ac-
companying notes 107-08 infra. However they may be explained, these inconsistencies
undermine the contention that the Framers unanimously agreed to the notion of sove-
reign immunity.
97. J. GOEBEL, supra note 93, 232-33; Nowak, supra note 80, at 1422-25.
98. See, J. GOEBEL, supra note 93, 233. But see Mathis, supra note 28, at 211 n.16
(Wilson may have proposed the idea).
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cited no debate in the Committee of Detail or the Committee of the
Whole.9 9 No precedent for the clause existed in any of -the five plans
submitted to the Committee of Detail for consideration, 100 though it
has been proposed that "[w]ithout doubt the underlying considerations
were akin to those which prompted the diversity clause-indeed, this
clause is a fortiori .... ,101 This explanation, however, assumes, con-
trary to the apparent positions of Hamilton, Madison and Marshall,
that the clause includes what it appears to include: both suits in which
states were to be plaintiffs and suits in which they were to appear as
defendants. Prejudice would be equally present in either case.10 2
At least two members of the Committee of Detail, Wilson and
Randolph, later interpreted the clause to include suits against a state
as defendant. James Wilson, of course, wrote one of the majority opin-
ions in Chisholm, 0 3 but he had earlier argued the same points before
the Pennsylvania Convention:
When this power is attended to, it will be found to be a necessary
one. Impartiality is the leading feature in this Constitution; it per-
vades the whole. When a citizen has a controversy with another state,
there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a just
and equal footing.10 4
Edmund Randolph as Governor of Virginia submitted the Virginia
Plan, with its emphasis on a national judiciary, to the Constitutional
Convention; as Attorney General of the United States he acted as coun-
sel for the plaintiff in Chisholm.0 5 He too argued before the Virginia
Convention the position that article III included suits against the state
as a defendant. 00
99. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1424.
100. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 18.
101. Id.
102. On purely logical grounds, one might of course argue that Hart and Wechsler
assume no such thing. In that case their premise must be that a very extreme form of
protection for the states was originally intended, namely that while the states could not
be sued in federal courts, they had the right to a federal court when suing citizens of
other states. Such a premise is implied by those who argue that the whole notion of
sovereign immunity was so engrained in the minds of the Framers and the holding of
Chisholm so improbable that the majority's position in that case could not possibly have
been correct or widely held. See Mathis, supra note 28, at 211 n.16. That argument,
however, rebuts itself, since the majority of the court did adopt those views.
103. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 453-66 (1793).
104. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 491 (1901).
105. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419-29 (1793).
106. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 207 (1901).
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Of the three authors frequently quoted to establish the consensus
of the Framers, John Marshall was later as Chief Justice to construe
the eleventh amendment strictly: "[A] case arising under the constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the
Union, whoever may be the parties to that case.' 1 0 7 Hamilton, in Num-
ber 80 of The Federalist, assumed a position apparently inconsistent
with that taken in Number 81:
And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess
the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will
follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which
one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. 08
These apparent inconsistencies in the interpretation of article III
also surround the proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment.
The opinions in Chisholm were read on February 18, 1793; on Feb-
ruary 19, a resolution for an amendment to the Constitution was in-
troduced in the House; and on February 20, the resolution that was
with one important change to become the eleventh amendment was
introduced in -the Senate: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not extend to suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citi-
zens or subjects of any foreign State."'1 9 These proposals were post-
poned, but in the next session of Congress Senator Caleb Strong of
Massachusetts re-introduced the Senate resolution of February 20, 1793,
adding the mysterious amendment: "The Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend . .. ."110
The proposal passed both houses of Congress by overwhelming
majorities. Federalist and Antifederalist alike endorsed the amend-
ment, and within a year three-quarters of the states had ratified it, al-
though it was not proclaimed by President Adams until January 8,
107. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383.
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 478 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For
a discussion, see Nowak, supra note 82, at 1427.
109. 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 651 (1793). For the background, see Cullison, supra
note 3, at 12-13.
110. 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 25 (1794) (emphasis added). It may be hazarded
as a guess that the immediate source of the phrase was a resolution of the Massachusetts
legislature sent to the Congress in September 1793. RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 31-32 (1793), printed in Mathis, supra
note 28, at 225.
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1798.11' The rapidity with which the amendment was proposed and
ratified is astonishing and the apparent about-face of the Federalists in
particular demands explanation. Since Warren's thesis of an outraged
and betrayed consensus can no longer command adherence, at least on
his understanding of the nature of that consensus, other historians have
proposed new solutions.
The most obvious one for the unanimity shown in adopting the
amendment is found in the growing number of cases brought against
the states.112 Between 1791 and 1798 seven (or possibly eight) 13 suits
were filed, of which two reached jury verdicts, two were settled (one
of them, Chisholm, after judgment), and three were dismissed. Only
one of the cases involved a suit by a British subject to recover seques-
tered land; one was a suit to enjoin Virginia from interfering with
claimed title to land; one was part of -the Yazoo Land Scheme and was
brought to compel the state to accept tender and pass title; four cases
were brought to collect acknowledged or unacknowledged debts." 4 It
is impossible to be sure from the scanty records of these cases, but it
appears that none of these cases clearly raised a question of federal
right.
Other historians have speculated that the Federalists no longer
felt haunted by the spectre of state default after the United States in
the 1790's assumed responsibility for most of the states' debts and it
rapidly became clear that the states were capable of paying the re-
mainder.16 A corollary to this thesis is the hypothesis that the Fed-
eralists also came -to realize that their property interests were ade-
quately protected by the federal courts' undoubted power to declare
the federal rights of individuals in suits between private parties. 1 6 One
historian has even argued that -the war-scares of 1794-1795 caused the
Federalists to espouse the amendment for purely political reasons-in
order to appear more anti-British than the Antifederalists." 7
111. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1436-37 (gives the breakdown of the voting);
Mathis, supra note 28, at 227-28.
112. See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 93, at 734; Mathis, supra note 28, at
228.
113. See Mathis, Georgia Before the Supreme Court: The First Decade, 12 Am. J.
LEG. HIST. 112 (1968).
114. Compare Jacobs, Prelude to Amendment: The States before the Court, supra
note 94, at 36-37, with Mathis, supra note 28, at 207-30.
115. Jacobs, Prelude to Amendment: The States before the Court, supra note 94,
at 37-40.
116. 0. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AmENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN ImMuNITY 72
(1972).
117. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1438-41.
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All of these positions have some merit and are not mutually ex-
clusive, but their power to compel assent is strengthened immensely
if the assumption is made that the Federalists did not abandon over-
night their pre-Chisholm views and in fact saw little variance between
their original positions and the new amendment. A second necessary
assumption is that the Federalists did not feel overly constrained or
threatened in their traditional interests by the amendment. Both of
these requirements are met by the thesis that the eleventh amendment
did indeed "overrule" Chisholm and reinstate the original Federalist
understanding of article III expressed by Justice Iredell (himself a
Federalist, though a peculiarly states-rights one) in his dissent in
Chisholm. In this view the eleventh amendment problem should be
seen as one of separation of powers, not one of federalism. Even the
Federalists would have felt threatened by a judiciary which considered
the grant of jurisdiction in article III, section 2 to be self-executing
and independent of all congressional control in spheres that were tradi-
tionally of only local concern, such as the pre-Chisholm cases brought
against the states.
This position has much to recommend it historically. The addi-
tion of the phrase, "be construed to," to the eleventh amendment
makes most sense if read in conjunction with the original version
which it was meant to amend. It changes an absolute limitation on
the judicial power into a prohibition of the power assumed by the
majority in Chisholm, that is, the power to extend the judicial power
independently of congressional authorization into areas of traditionally
local interest.
It should be noted, however, that this position does not presume
that the Federalists opposed a self-executing grant of jurisdiction over
cases involving a clearly federal interest. In fact, at least one of the
early proposals of article III considered by the Constitutional Con-
vention contained language suggesting that the Federalists' position was
quite the opposite. The draft proposals of the Committee of Detail
that first included the phrase "between a state and a citizen or citizens
of another state," extended jurisdiction as follows: " 'To such other
cases as the national legislature may assign, as involving the national
peace and harmony, . . . in disputes between a state and a citizen or
citizens of another state . ... ' "I's Professor John E. Nowak views this
proposal as evidence of "[a] more plausible explanation of the drafters'
118. See Nowak, supra note 80, at 1425 (quoting THE REcoRDs OF THlE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 146-47 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) ).
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intent," namely, "that they meant Congress to have the power to grant
jurisdiction in suits by a citizen of one state against another state."1 19
This view seems to imply that the words "disputes between a state and
a citizen or citizens of another state," initially were understood to in-
clude cases in which states were defendants. If this is true, then it may
be argued that the Convention's deletion of the phrase removed a re-
striction on the judicial power and thus indicates an intention to be-
stow on the federal courts some inherent jurisdiction in the class of
cases involving both matters of federal interest and the states as de-
fendants. 20
Historical positions akin to that taken here have been reached by
several authors in the past few years.' 2 ' Mr. Justice Brennan also has
expressed somewhat similar views.12 This new consensus is something
of an historical vogue and represents, if nothing else, a general dis-
satisfaction with absolutist notions on sovereign immunity; an acknowl-
edgement that legitimate interests of the states are better served by a
case-by-case analysis under the principles of the tenth amendment; and
a growing sense of the importance and necessity of federal regulatory
power over the states. In addition, this new view probably represents
a closer approximation to the actual intention of the Framers of the
Constitution than did the traditional view.
All of these recent views, however, with the exception of Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan's, have tended to emphasize the role of Congress as initia-
tor and regulator of the process, substituting, in a sense, Congress' ex-
plicit statutory abrogation of a state's immunity in place of -the state's
own explicit waiver of that immunity. This emphasis has excluded two
important elements from consideration: Congress' general remedial
legislation and the pervasive Federalist notion that federal constitu-
tional rights are in a unique position in the constitutional plan. In-
deed, this last point, if the views that Chief Justice Marshall expressed
in 1821 are any indication, could well have been one of the factors mo-
tivating Federalist acceptance of the eleventh amendment: "[A] case
arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cog-
119. Id.
120. Professor Nowak argues, however, that the Convention's deletion of the "as-
signment" phrase does not necessarily indicate its intention to deprive Congress of the
power to assign cases involving the national peace and harmony. Id.
121. For example, by Tribe, supra note 22, and Nowak, supra note 80.
122. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298-324 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parden v. Terminal
Ry. of Ala., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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nizable in the Courts of -the Union, whoever may be the parties to that
case."-123
II. THE EROSION OF IMMUNITY: THE IMPLIED WAIVER
CASES AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In the late 1950's and early 1960's the real point in issue in the
sovereign immunity and eleventh amendment cases was increasingly
recognized as one of federal remedy, not merely of federal right,
2 4
and the question was at last posed in terms of congressional power to
provide an individual a remedy against the states, that is, of congres-
sional power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.
A. The Implied Waiver Cases
The doctrine -that state law governed questions of a state's waiver
of sovereign immunity125 and that such waivers would be found only
where made 'by the state "in the most express language,' 2 clearly re-
flects the traditional position on the "constitutionalization" of sover-
eign immunity. In 1959, the Court began to examine and question this
position. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission'2 was a
Jones Act claim against a bi-state commission. Acting under its com-
123. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821). It should be noted
that this view of the background of the eleventh amendment was not shared by all
men at the time. For a very interesting example of preparations for Chisholm v. Georgia
before the fact, see Alexander Dallas's curious footnote in M'Carty v. Nixon, 1 U.S.
(1 Dal].) 77 (1784).
124. This distinction between right and remedy is, of course, the point made by
Justice Iredell in Chisholm and reflects the arguments made above that, in the plan of
the Constitution, an exercise of congressional power was necessary to subject the states to
suit in federal court on traditionally state-law questions such as that involved in
Chisholm.
However, insofar as the distinction rests on a requirement of explicit federal statu-
tory abrogation of sovereign immunity and rejects the application of general remedial
statutes and remedies derived directly from the Constitution, it can be strongly argued
that the distinction misconstrues the nature of the federalism created by the Constitution
as well as the profound change effected by the fourteenth amendment. Of course, it must
be recognized that such arguments have long been considered closed. Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934), for example, explicitly takes this position: "The
sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the
source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to a cause of action arising
under acts of Congress . . . and to those arising from some violation of rights conferred
upon the citizens by the Constitution."
125. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
126. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). For a discussion
of the waiver doctrine and the impact of Petty and Parden, see Comment, supra note
43, at 336-45 (1966).
127. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
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pact, clause powers, 28 Congress had approved the interstate contract
creating the Commission and had added a rider specifying that the
compact did not impair the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
navigable waters or commerce. 29 The Supreme Court treated the ques-
tion of waiver as one of federal law and held that the states' activities
with knowledge of the rider constituted an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity. 30
Five years later, in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State
Docks Department,131 the question arose again, this time in the con-
text of a FELA claim against a state-operated railroad. The holding in
the case was "perhaps not unambiguously phrased," as Mr. Justice
Brennan, its author, later admitted. 132 On the one hand, Parden was
based on the traditional doctrine of waiver as it had been expounded
in Petty:
It remains the law that a State may not be sued by an individual
without its consent. Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it
began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after
enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was au-
thorized by that Act.im
On the other hand, the Court clearly rejected the position that "Con-
gress [was] without power, in view of the immunity doctrine, thus to
subject a State to suit"'31 4 and held that "[b]y empowering Congress
to regulate commerce, then, the States necessarily surrendered any por-
tion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regula-
tion." 13 5 The Court distinguished Hans in a similarly contradictory
fashion. As an action on a debt, Parden was "precisely the 'evil' against
which both the Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity
doctrine of the Hans case were directed"; 3 6 at the same time Hans was
128. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
129. 359 U.S. at 277.
130. Id. at 280.
131. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
132. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 301 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. 377 U.S. at 192.
134. Id. at 190. The two questions presented to the Court for consideration were:
"(1) Did Congress in enacting the FELA intend to subject a State to suit in these cir-
cunstances? (2) Did it have the power to do so, as against the State's claim of im-
munity?" Id. at 187.
135. Id. at 192.
136. Id. at 187.
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distinguishable from Parden on the grounds that no federal statutory
claim was involved in Hans.137
On the question of the states' consent to suit under a federal statu-
tory scheme, the majority opinion in Parden arguably rendered irrele-
vant any inquiry into the explicitness of congressional intent to abro-
gate the states' immunity from suit in federal court: mere statutory
language that covered the situation in question would appear to be
sufficient. 138 It is also arguable, under one of the conflicting bases of
the case, that consent of a state, actual or implied, is irrelevant. Both
of these positions, however, have been implicitly rejected by later cases
which have treated Parden as resting on the doctrine of implied con-
sent enunciated in Petty, and have explicitly inquired into congres-
sional intent to lift the states' immunity.139
While this insistence on explicit congressional intent to abrogate
the immunity of the states may have some justification in areas of
traditionally exclusive state interest (as in Chisholm), it seems mis-
placed if applied to general congressional protection of fundamental
rights (such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983) or the judicial implication of rem-
edies directly from the Constitution for state violations of an individ-
ual's fundamental rights. Moreover, the return to the doctrine of con-
sent assumes the existence of a state immunity in relation to these
fundamental federal rights-an assumption that is probably not war-
ranted by history140 and that is certainly not warranted by any sound
system of jurisprudence. The very use of the eleventh amendment to
defend state interests deserving of protection appears misconceived; the
137. Id. The Court also disingenuously distinguished the other cases which had
raised federal question jurisdiction in eleventh amendment areas on the grounds that
they were "commonplace suits in which the federal question did not itself give rise to
the alleged cause of action against the State, but merely lurked in the background." Id.
n.3. If this statement is an implicit recognition that a federal remedy might be available
in a clearly presented case of a violation of a federal right, it is a hopeful sign. There
are other indications of the same sentiment. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32
(1918) (dismissal of very poorly drafted complaint, with the understanding that "no
Federal right [was] involved").
138. "[B]ecause of its surrender, no immunity exists that can be the subject of a
congressional declaration or a voluntary waiver." Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting and explaining his holding in Parden).
139. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
140. Hospital Assoc. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Toia, No. 77-6152 (2d Cir. Apr. 27,
1978) (discussing Congress' abortive attempt explicitly to condition the states' partici-
pation in Medicaid on their consent to suit); see text accompanying notes 82-123 supra.
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protection needed in a federal system is provided by the tenth amend-
ment. 14'
B. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 42
In 1976' the Court announced a major departure from the tradi-
tional doctrine. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer is a factually simple case and the
grounds for its holding are clear. The complexities and obscurities of
the case come rather from attempts to determine the presuppositions
necessary to support the holding and to divine the implications of the
case for the whole eleventh amendment area.
The plaintiff class in Fitzpatrick was composed of retired and
soon-to-be retired male employees of the State of Connecticut who sued
to enjoin an admitted differential in retirement benefits in favor of
female employees. They also sought to recover their attorneys' fees and
the amounts discriminatorily withheld. 143 Jurisdiction was first sought
on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1831 and 1348.
In 1972, however, Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act explicitly to include "governments, governmental agencies
[and] political subdivisions" within the statutory definition of employ-
ers, 44 and specifically authorized private suits against these governmen-
tal employers. 14 The plaintiffs added a count under the amended Act
and the case was thereafter litigated solely on that basis.
The district court easily found violations of Title VII, and en-
joined future violations of the Act,14 6 but because of the state's asser-
tion of its immunity, 47 it applied the doctrine of Hans v. Louisiana4
141. On the basis of the tenth amendment, the Court in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
which had held constitutional the extension of the FLSA to state employees. In effect
this renders nugatory and places on much firmer ground the Court's decision in Em-
ployees which had used the eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity to deny re-
covery to state employees. In a very well reasoned dissent in Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542 (1975), Mr. Justice Rehnquist outlined the elements of this new tenth amend-
ment protection for the states.
142. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
143. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
144. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Equal Employment Opportunity Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) Supp I 1972)).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp II 1972).
146. 390 F. Supp. at 280.
147. Id. at 284-85.
148. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans barred suits by citizens against their own states.
See text accompanying notes 57-72 supra.
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and Edelman v. Jordan149 to deny recovery of both back pay and at-
torneys' fees. 50 The court felt constrained to reach this result by its
reading of Edelman, despite -the fact that Edelman left three clear
grounds on which recovery of at least the attorneys' fees might have
been allowed. First, Edelman had continued the doctrine that some
"ancillary effect" on a state treasury was permissible if it was "a nec-
essary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive
federal-question determination .. . .*",, (The Second Circuit in
Fitzpatrick reversed on the issue of attorneys' fees on precisely this
point.) 152 Second, Edelman could also be read as limiting the area of
applicability of the eleventh amendment to situations in which the
award was to be paid directly 'from a state's treasury.1 3 Third, Edel-
man did not close the line of reasoning opened by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in Parden,54 though it did implicitly reject it by breathing new
life into the consent doctrine. 5 The district court in Fitzpatrick, how-
ever, expressly denied Congress' powers:
The award of attorneys' fees from state funds is tantamount to an
award of money damages. While the amount sought in this case is
not prohibitive, once the flood-gates are opened, adequate control no
longer prevails. Statutory authority cannot be permitted to frustrate
or pierce the Eleventh Amendment constitutional shield.'5 0
On appeal,157 the Second Circuit affirmed the injunctive relief and
the denial of recalculated benefits, but reversed as to the award of at-
149. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
150. 390 F. Supp. at 289.
151. 415 U.S. at 668. See also Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir.
1974).
152. 519 F.2d 559, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975).
153. See 415 U.S. at 668. In his concurring opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. at 458, Mr. Justice Stevens noted that Connecticut had isolated these pension
funds from the general state treasury, and used this segregation of funds to argue that
any revenue Connecticut would have to allocate in order to cover deficits caused by
the awards in this case would be merely a "necessary consequence of compliance in the
future" with the federal question determination. Id. at 459-60.
154. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 672. The same ambivalence found in
Parden was continued in Edelman:
The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amendment was found
in those cases [Petty and Parden] to turn on whether Congress had intended to
abrogate the immunity in question, and whether the State by its participation
in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abroga-
tion of that immunity.
Id.
155. See id. at 673-74.
156. 390 F. Supp. at 289 (emphasis added).
157. 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975).
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torneys' fees. The court's discussion of the eleventh amendment pre-
sents in microcosm the traditional learning, insisting that Chisholm
had been overruled by the eleventh amendment, while ignoring the
ambiguity latent in that assertion: "Since the Amendment was in-
tended to reverse the Chisholm decision, it has been interpreted not
literally but according to its purpose of restoring to Article III the
'fundamental rule of jurisprudence' that 'a state may not be sued with-
out its consent.' "11S5
It was in this context that the court faced the problem raised by
Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare.159 In Employees, Congress had amended the
FLSA to bring within its scope a class of state activities (state hospi-
tals), but had not specifically included remedies against the states in
the existing remedial provisions, although the general language of the
statute literally included the states. The Court had (in dicta) recog-
nized Congress' powers under the commerce clause, but, in the name
of "harmonious federalism" had declined to find so drastic an effect as
abrogation of sovereign immunity absent explicit authorization: "[W]e
decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress of its
commerce power, where the purpose of Congress to give force to the
Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States and putting
the States on the same footing as other employers is not clear."'10
158. Id. at 563, (quoting) Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)).
159. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
160. Id. at 286-87.
There is a possible ambiguity here as to whether the clarity of congressional intent
or the clarity of congressional expression is to act as talisman. See text accompanying
notes 138-39 supra.
The issue remains even after the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzpatrick. The 1976
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, amended
42 U.S.C. § 1988 to allow the courts in their discretion to award reasonable attorney's
fees as a part of a prevailing party's costs in civil rights actions brought under a number
of statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986. None of the Civil Rights Acts codified
in Title 42 was amended explicitly to include awards of attorney's fees against the
states, but congressional intent to achieve that effect is clear. See S. Rep. No. 94-1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5908, 5913.
Every appellate court so far to consider the issue has concluded that, under Fitz-
patrick, congressional intent is sufficient. E.g., King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st
Cir. 1977); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 559 F.2d 1286, 1300 (5th Cir.
1977); Stanton v. Bond, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded to allow con-
sideration of the new Attorney's Fees Act, 499 U.S. 973 (1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 172
(7th Cir. 1977).
Only one court, resurrecting the Supreme Court's decision in Employees, has re-
fused to enforce the Act against the states absent explicit language. Skehan v. Board of
Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 436 F. Supp. 657, 665-67 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
The issue is now squarely before the Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 410 F.
Supp. 251, 281-85 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Finney v. Hutto,
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The statute in question in Fitzpatrick clearly provided for suit
against the states,16' and the court so found. 62 Just as clearly, the state
had not consented. The court thus found itself in the traditional box:
the eleventh amendment restated the "fundamental rule" of sovereign
immunity underlying the entire Constitution; consequently article III
was incapable of receiving, and article I of giving, jurisdiction over
damage actions against the states. Faced with this dilemma, the plain-
tiffs argued a position that at the very least violates the principle of Oc-
cam's Razor, which rejects unnecessary elaboration.16 They argued
that even though article III had been diminished by the eleventh
amendment, the fourteenth amendment had restored it, at least in the
area of civil rights. The court accepted the plaintiffs' historical argu-
ments for the sake of discussion, but based its holding on the narrower
issue of
whether the particular remedy sought here, a private federal action
for retroactive damages, is a constitutionally permissible method of
enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the immu-
nity granted to the states -by the Eleventh Amendment. Accepting the
fact that legislation enforcing individual rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment must to some extent subject states to private suits, it does
not follow that Congress necessarily has power to provide the particu-
lar remedy sought here.164
Quoting from Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Perez v. Ledesma,66
the court then held that "Ex parte Young was the culmination of
efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of the rights and powers se-
cured elsewhere in the Constitution."'66 (This despite the fact that
Young explicitly refused to consider the effect of the fourteenth
amendment on the eleventh.) 67 This balance reached in Young, the
court continued, must not be disturbed unless all the other means that
Congress undoubtedly does have at its disposal for effecting the pur-
548 F. 2d 740 (8th i-. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1977)
(No. 76-1660). See the summary of the oral argument before the Court in 46 U.S.L.W.
3535-36 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1978).
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. 1976).
162. 519 F.2d at 568.
163. "Frustra sit per plure quod potest fieri per pauciora." 3 (Pt. 1) G. SAITON,
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 557 (1947) (It is silly to do by means of
many things what can be done with fewer).
164. Id. at 569.
165. 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. 519 F.2d at 570.
167. 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908).
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poses of the fourteenth amendment have proven so ineffective that this
novel remedy of a damage suit against the states must have been im-
plied in the intent of the ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment. 168 At
best this is a curious-indeed Pyrrhic-way to uphold the principle of
the eleventh amendment, presuming as it does that the ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment intended to impart to Congress a power to cre-
ate novel remedies when necessary. At worst it is totally beside the
point in light of the historical discussion above. 69 What is extraordi-
nary is the court's readiness to place the eleventh amendment above
articles I and III and above the fourteenth amendment, and to do this
for reasons that are grounded, if anywhere, in the tenth rather than the
eleventh amendment.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the award of both at-
torneys' fees and retroactive benefits on the basis of Congress' powers
under section five of the fourteenth amendment. °70 Although there is
still some language in the opinion which suggests that what is in ques-
tion is the consent of -the states, 17' the real focus of the opinion is Con-
gress' power to abrogate the state's immunity. And while the holding
is very narrow, explicitly restricting itself to the impact of the four-
teenth amendment on Congress' powers, 172 it has very broad impli-
cations for the future because of the very scope of those powers under
section five.
It is true that none of these previous cases [on the effect of the
fourteenth amendment] presented the question of the relationship be-
tween the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement power granted
to Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we think
that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana . ., are necessarily limited
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by
appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state
authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercis-
ing legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the con-
stitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of
a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms
168. 519 F.2d at 570.
169. See text accompanying notes 109-18 supra.
170. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
171. Id. at 452.
172. In this sense, Mr. Justice Brennan may be correct that the Court is not re-
jecting his view (expressed in Parden and in dissent in Employees) that Congress could
have abrogated the states' immunity under its commerce clause powers. Id. at 457-58
(concurring opinion). The tenor of the case, however, appears to reject his position.
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embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may,
in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.1 73
The opinion is silent on the manner in which the judicial power under
article III-which the traditional learning had considered impaired by
the eleventh amendment-was restored in order to function as a proper
receptacle for this enhanced congressional power.
III. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND IMPLIED REMEDIES
Congress' power to authorize suits against the states in the state
courts on federal causes of action is well established. Since its enact-
ment in 1966, for example, section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act has authorized suit in "any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction,"'174 and after its 1972 amendments, the Act specifically in-
cluded certain state operations (notably hospitals) within its definition
of "employers."'175 Congress' power to compel the states to enforce the
federal statutory right, however, has been subject to considerable dis-
cussion and doubt. In the Second Circuit's opinion in Fitzpatrick, for
example, the court raised the question whether "Congress could, con-
sistently with the Tenth Amendment, compel a state to permit its citi-
zens to enforce their Fourteenth Amendment rights against it in its
courts," and whether a "state might decline to exercise such congres-
sionally mandated jurisdiction on grounds of sovereign immunity."'17
The opinion intimates that the supremacy clause and the principle of
Testa v. Katt 77 would probably serve to answer the first part of its
173. Id. at 456. In a footnote the Court mentioned that the state did "not con-
tend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper exer-
cise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456
n.11. Only Mr. Justice Stevens was concerned with this problem and held that since
the plaintiffs had failed to prove a violation of the fourteenth amendment and since it
was doubtful that these 1972 amendments to Title VII were "needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" under the test announced in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), it was questionable whether Congress could abro-
gate the states' immunity in that case.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
175. 29. U.S.C.A. § 203(r) (Supp. 1976).
176. 519 F.2d at 571 & n.22.
177. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (in general, a state court may not refuse to enforce a
federally created right).
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question in the affirmative, but expressed no opinion on the eleventh
amendment question.178
In his dissent in Employees, Mr. Justice Marshall has gone one
step further. In his view, the eleventh amendment remains a bar to
suits against the states in the federal courts, but, since the states' non-
constitutional (i.e., common law) immunity was modified pro tanto
by their adoption of the Constitution, sovereign immunity is no bar-
rier to congressionally mandated suits in the state courts. "[T]he courts
of the State... have an independent constitutional obligation to en-
tertain . . . actions to enforce [federal rights under the FLSA]."'179 In
particular, Justice Marshall has argued that any statutory language
broad enough to cover the states removes without more their immu-
nity in their own courts. At least one state court appears to have ac-
cepted this position (though it also found specific intent on Congress'
part to cover the particular case at bar) ,180 but other state courts have
rejected the argument out of hand: "It appears to this court to remain
the law under the Eleventh Amendment that a state may not be sued
for damages by an individual under federal law, without its con-
sent and that this principle applies equally to state as well as federal
courts."'' Each of these cases involved suits under section 16(b) of the
FLSA as amended in 1972 and each required a certain amount of in-
ference to determine Congress' intent to abrogate immunity under the
general statutory language.
Congress has attempted to rectify the anomaly of a clear federal
right without a forum in which to enforce it by amending section 16
(b) again in 1974 specifically to authorize suits against state employers
in federal and state courts. 8 2 In the future -this will require the Court
to determine two important questions. The first is the question an-
swered ambiguously in Parden: Congress' ability under its commerce
clause powers to abrogate ,the sovereign immunity of the states in fed-
eral courts. The second is Congress' power to abrogate that immunity
in the courts of the state. Under any analysis but that of a strict theory
of constitutional embodiment of sovereign immunity there can be little
doubt of Congress' powers in the second situation 8 3 The first situa-
178. 519 F.2d at 571.
179. 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973). The majority opinion left the question open. Id.
at 287.
180. Clover Bottom Hosp. and School v. Townsend, 513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974).
181. Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 10, 346 N.E.2d 305, 315 (1976).
182. Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259.
183. See the analysis of the court in Clover Bottom Hosp. and School v. Town-
send, 513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974).
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tion also would appear to be within Congress' powers, 8 4 but will re-
quire a considerable adjustment of the traditional learning on sover-
eign immunity, perhaps along the lines suggested in Part II of this
Comment.18 5
The harder question is, of course, that of requiring the state courts
to entertain suits against the states, despite their immunity, in order to
protect non-statutory federal rights. General Oil Co. v. Crain's estab-
lished the states' duty in this regard, 87 at least with regard to injunc-
tive relief:
Necessarily to give adequate protection to constitutional rights a
distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws, as de-
termining the character of the suit against state officers. And the suit
at bar illustrates the necessity. If a suit against state officers is pre-
cluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is con-
tended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by
this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the
enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nulli-
fied as to much of its operation. 88
Where money damages for state violations of constitutional rights
are concerned, however, the result has been different: the states feel
no constitutional obligation to provide remedies, 8 9 just as the federal
courts in similar cases-Hans, for example-have felt compelled not
to grant them. The problem, 'therefore, is and always has been one of
federal remedy, not of federal right.
In a recent article, Professor John E. Nowak has discussed the re-
spective roles of the federal courts and the Congress in the eleventh
amendment area and has concluded that "the pragmatic problems of
federalism posed by the eleventh amendment should be resolved by
Congress, not by the judiciary."'190 He bases his conclusions on the po-
litical isolation of the courts and the unique position of Congress as
representative of both local and national interests, open to state in-
184. See text accompanying notes 131-39 & 159-60 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 93-123 supra.
186. 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (decided the same day as Ex parte Young).
187. But see Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949);
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 935.
188. 209 U.S. at 226.
189. See, e.g., Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015 (1976);
Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
190. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1441.
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fluence exerted to modify or repeal statutes that overly encroach on
state interests. This thesis has considerable merit in the area Nowak
primarily focuses on-the courts' role in construing general language
in federal regulatory statutes, such as that found in Parden, and in bal-
ancing the relative federal and state interests in the regulated area-
but it errs in importing -this judicial deference into the area of funda-
mental constitutional rights. His second principle, for example, that
"causes of action may be implied only where the state has expressly
waived its immunity or where it has some meaningful ability to ter-
minate the regulated activity,"''1 has some truth in the area of federal
regulation of traditional state activities, but it is plainly inappropriate
in the domain of nationalized fundamental rights.
Professor Walter Dellinger, in discussing the amenability of judi-
cially implied remedies to congressional control and amendment, has
pointed out the flaw in a position such as Nowak's: "Congress may dis-
place the remedial forms, just as a state court system may choose to
follow an alternative procedure, in such cases."'u 2 The more funda-
mental error in Nowak's thesis, however, is its misconception of funda-
mental federal rights in a federal system. The problem has been ap-
parent since the days of Chief Justice Marshall:
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to de-
serve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.193
[A] case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
is cognizable in the courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties
to that case.'"
In the years since Marbury and Gohens the problem has to some
extent been alleviated by the doctrines of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States'95 and Ex parte Young9 6 and reduced to what Profes-
191. Id. at 1448.
192. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv.
L. R v. 1532, 1548 (1972).
193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
194. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383, 392 (1821).
195. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Osborn held that the eleventh amendment
did not bar suits against state officials. Although severely restricted by later cases, see,
e.g., Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887), this holding ultimately resulted in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
In Osborn the Chief Justice also reiterated the doctrine announced in Cohens: "The
[eleventh] amendment has its full effect, if the constitution be construed as it would
have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the court never been extended to suits
brought against a state, by the citizens of another state, or by aliens." Id. at 857-58.
196. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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sor Louis Jaffe has called the "core area"-state contracts, treasury lia-
bility for tort, and adjudication of interests in property which the state
has acquired without tort. 9 7 Hans v. Louisiana9" exemplifies the first
category, Palmer v. Ohio'99 the second, and the tax cases, Great North-
ern Life Insurance Co. v. Read20 0 and Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury,20 ' the third.
For a time, this core area was considerably diminished, and the is-
sues involved sharpened and focused by a more refined perception of
fundamental constitutional rights. In Thompson v. Shapiro,20 2 for ex-
ample, a three-judge federal court ordered an officer of the state of
Connecticut to make retroactive payment of welfare benefits withheld
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The order was made de-
spite the state's claim of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court af-
firmed,20 3 as it did in several other such cases, 20 4 without discussion on
the point. The trend was reversed in Edelman v. Jordan,2°5 however,
where the Court explicitly disapproved this part of these holdings.
Edelman has subsequently been followed by the lower federal courts, 200
and interpreted as the death-knell of -the use of the fourteenth amend-
ment as a basis for federal jurisdiction to award retroactive remedies
free from the eleventh amendment's strictures.2 0 7 Only Mr. Justice
Marshall, dissenting in Edelman in an opinion in which Mr. Justice
Blackmun joined, pointed out that the majority had not foreclosed this
issue:
It should be noted that there has been no determination in this
case that state action is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, the Court necessarily does not decide whether the States'
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity may have been limited by
the later enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that
such a limitation is necessary to effectuate the purposes of that
Amendment .... 208
197. L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 221.
198. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See also Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
199. 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
200. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
201. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
202. 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
203. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
204. E.g., State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972).
205. 415 U.S. 651, 670-71.
206. E.g., Wilkerson v. Meskill, 501 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1974), Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974); Burton v. Wailer, 502 F.2d 1261, 1273
(5th Cir. 1974).
207. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
208. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 694 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In much the same way-although with perhaps greater historical
justification--42 U.S.C. § 1983, which at first glance appears to belong
to the same category of federal statutory enactments construed in Fitz-
patrick, has been judicially nullified as a remedy against the states. The
statute enjoys an extremely curious ambivalence: it and its jurisdic-
tional counterpart (28 U.S.C. § 1348) clearly give federal courts juris-
diction to enjoin state officials who (under the fiction of Ex parte
Young) are attempting to enforce unconstitutional statutes.20 9 At the
same time, although section 1983 will sustain an award of damages
against such officials personally,210 it will not sustain a damage award
if it is in fact or effect against the state. This curious result rests on
two separable21' but often confused grounds: (1) a state, or an indi-
vidual state officer, in his official capacity is not a "person" for pur-
poses of section 1983; 212 (2) the eleventh amendment bars monetary
remedies against the states under section 1983.213 This last view was
adopted by the majority in Edelman.214
Although there is some language in the congressional debates over
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (of which section 1983
was a part), which might indicate an intention to hold the state gov-
ernments financially liable under that section,215 -the better view his-
torically appears to be that such was not in fact the intention of Con-
gress.2 10 In this situation, if there is 'to be a damage remedy for state
violations of fundamental rights absent express congressional action,
recourse must be had to the fourteenth amendment and judicially im-
plied remedies for the protection of fourteenth amendment rights.
If we understand Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics21 7 as "resting upon a premise that consti-
tutional rights have a self-executing force that not only permits but
requires the courts to recognize remedies appropriate for their vindi-
cation,1 218 judicially implied remedies for violations of fundamental
209. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970).
210. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974). For the most recent dis-
cussion of these paradoxes, see Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977).
211. See Rochester v. White, 503 F.2d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 1974).
212. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
ex tel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84, 86 (3d Cir. 1969).
213. See Meyer v. New Jersey, 460 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1972); Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971).
214. 415 U.S. at 675-76. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977).
215. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1465.
216. Id. at 1464-68.
217. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
218. Dellinger, supra note 192, at 1557.
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right appear self-evident in a federal system. The question then is:
Why has such an evident proposition not been recognized?
The argument advanced above that article III was not intended
to be a self-executing abrogation of sovereign immunity has been ex-
tended by some219 from the area of .traditionally state interests, as ex-
emplified by Chisholm, to areas of primarily national interest. This
extension is certainly not mandated by any discussion in the Consti-
tutional Convention 220 or by early cases interpreting the eleventh
amendment221 and, moreover, stands squarely opposed to that "vast
transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in
the late 18th century, '" 2 2 the fourteenth amendment. 22
Ex parte Young224 has been characterized as the "culmination of
efforts by [the Supreme Court] to harmonize the principles of the
Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and pow-
ers secured elsewhere in the Constitution, ' '2 5 and as the "watershed"
permitting the Civil War Amendments "to serve as a sword, rather
than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to pro-
tect."226 The Court in Young, however, refused even to discuss the
effect of the fourteenth amendment on the eleventh 227 and avoided the
issue by use of a fiction. In addition, as a sword Ex parte Young is
singularly ineffective, since it encourages the states to violate consti-
tutional rights, secure in the knowledge that prospective damages are
all that they stand to lose.22 8
To the extent that any principle of general application may be
derived from Bivens and its progeny, it would appear to be the prin-
ciple that where the Constitution provides substantive protection to an
219. E.g., Nowak, supra note 80, at 1445-53; Tribe, supra note 22, at 699-700
n.81.
220. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 475 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
221. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
222. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
223. For a discussion of the relevant congressional debates on the Civil War
Amendments, see Nowak, supra note 80, at 1453-64, who insists that absence of ex-
press intent to allow damage suits against the states as remedies for constitutional vio-
lations necessarily precludes such remedies. Such an absence of express intent, however,
has not prevented judicial action in other areas where it was necessary to effectuate
constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
224. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
225. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
226. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
227. 209 U.S. at 149-50.
228. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nor.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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individual in a certain situation and no other remedy fully vindicates
that right or effects that protection, the courts should imply a remedy
directly from the Constitution. 29 This final condition-absence of al-
ternative remedies-not only recognizes the superior qualifications of
Congress or state legislatures to evaluate the complex issues involved
in selecting remedies, but also gives to the states all the protection that
the eleventh amendment should extend in a federal system, that is, the
primary opportunity to provide a forum and a remedy for injuries to
constitutionally protected rights. The tax cases2 30 are an illustration of
this:
These cases declare the rule that clear declaration of a State's consent
to suit against itself in the federal court on fiscal claims is required.
The reason underlying the rule, which is discussed in the Read and
Ford cases, is the right of a State to reserve for its courts the primary
consideration and decision of its own tax litigation because of the di-
rect impact of such litigation upon its finances. 23'
This is not a licensing of constitutional irresponsibility, but a reflec-
tion of "the special considerations that dictate noninterference by the
federal judiciary in the enforcement of state tax laws where there is an
express remedial procedure provided in state courts."' 2 2 Absent such
a readily available state-or, after Fitzpatrick, federal-remedy, federal
judicial deference is misplaced.
Two ways to enforce federal rights might emerge under -this an-
alysis: the first and least obtrusive on the states' internal administra-
tion is that suggested by a comparison of Bivens with General Oil Co.
v. Crain.233 General Oil held that under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution a state must provide a forum and enforce a federal right,
including an implied one, in spite of its own state-law immunity, and
that review would lie in the Supreme Court to ensure the state's com-
pliance. Under the approach suggested by Bivens, the federal courts
would of necessity have jurisdiction to award damages against a state
229. See Dellinger, supra note 192, at 1551.
230. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
231. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946).
232. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d at 992 (emphasis added) accord, Dellinger,
supra note 192, at 1557-58 see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 126-27 (1971).
233. 209 U.S. 211 (1908) accord, Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920)
see text accompanying notes 184-86 supra.
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for violation of constitutionally protected rights when the state has
failed to provide an available forum and an adequate remedy.234
Something on the order of these suggestions is manifestly neces-
sary. The unfairness and irrationality of the present system may be
illustrated by a comparison of two remarkably similar cases which in-
volved a government's flooding of private land. In Jacobs v. United
StatesY 5 the Supreme Court implied a remedy against the federal gov-
ernment directly from the fifth amendment. In Palmer v. Ohio1 6 how-
ever, a completely analogous situation in which a state was responsible
for the flooding of -the land, the Court dismissed the complaint. No
legitimate rationale can justify the second result, and no responsible
system of jurisprudence can allow it to stand.
JOHN PATRICK DEVENEY
234. A variant of this approach is that rejected in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S.
711 (1882), in which the relators brought suit in a federal court to compel the state
court to disregard a state constitutional provision that was in violation of the United
States Constitution.
235. 290 U.S. 13 (1933). For a discussion of the case, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 3, at 1403.
236. 248 U.S. 32 (1928).
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